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Abstract
A“ ﬁre sale” occurs when the owner of a good oﬀers it for sale at a price
strictly below the price that some buyers would willingly pay for the good.
H ed o e ss ob e c a u s et h ea d v a n t a g eo ft h eq u i c ks a l em a d ep o s s i b l eb yt h el o w e r
price outweighs the higher price that other potential buyers would pay, given
the likely delay in locating these buyers in the latter case. Fire sales can occur
only in illiquid markets. This paper generalizes earlier treatments of illiquid
markets by assuming that the asset can be oﬀered for sale at any time, rather
than only after its owner loses his capacity to operate it proﬁtably. Also, it
speciﬁes that proﬁtability follows a random walk.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
In a common usage, a “ﬁre sale” occurs when the owner of a capital (or consumer)
good oﬀers it for sale at a price strictly below the price that some buyers would
willingly pay for the good. He does so because the advantage of the quick sale made
possible by the lower price outweighs the higher price that other potential buyers
would pay, given the likely delay in locating these buyers in the latter case. As
this description makes clear, ﬁre sales can occur only in illiquid markets. In liquid
markets, by deﬁnition, a seller can count on locating buyers with the highest valuation
virtually immediately, so he or she has no motivation to sell at a price lower than
such buyers would pay.
Two earlier papers (John Krainer and Stephen F. LeRoy [3] and David L. Kelly
and LeRoy [2]) analyzed the valuation of illiquid assets in a search-and-matching
setting. In these models potential buyers with diﬀerent valuations of the asset that
is oﬀered for sale arrive one per period. The seller must either sell to the current
buyer or incur the costly delay of waiting for a buyer with a higher valuation. These
1This version of the paper is preliminary, and numerical calculations may be incorrect. Please
do not cite or quote.
1models produce equilibria in which capital assets are sold at ﬁre sale prices as deﬁned
above.
However, the authors of the cited papers imposed a highly stylized and unrealistic
characterization of the environment. First, it was assumed in both papers that
owners of capital assets have a “match” that governs the operating proﬁtf r o mt h e
asset (when a match is broken, the owner permenantly loses the ability to operate
the factory proﬁtably). The realization of a Markov chain determines whether the
buyer’s match continues to the next period. The seller was assumed to be able to
oﬀer the asset for sale after losing his match, and only then. This assumption is the
analogue of the corresponding speciﬁcation in models of labor markets that workers
can search for new jobs only when they are unemployed. The assumption is acceptable
in a job search setting since searching for a new job can plausibly be assumed to
take more time than is available to an already-employed worker. However, the
corresponding assumption in the context of capital markets is unacceptable, except
as a crude approximation: it is hardly reasonable to require that a corporation cannot
simultaneously operate a capital asset and search for a buyer for that asset.
Second, the cited papers assumed that the operating proﬁt generated by a capital
asset is constant as long as the owner’s match continues. As a consequence of this
speciﬁcation the models miss the important point that the extent of ﬁre sale pricing
depends on operating proﬁt: the lower the proﬁt, the deeper the price discount.
The model presented below remedies both of these defects: ﬁrst, owners of the
capital asset can oﬀer the asset for sale at all dates, not just after losing their match.
In equilibrium they do so whenever the probability of successful sale is nonzero (which
is the case only when at least some potential new owners can operate the asset more
proﬁtably than the current owner). Second, operating proﬁt is assumed to follow
a random walk, rather than being constant as long as the match continues. This
speciﬁcation makes it possible to show how the ﬁre sale discount depends on operating
proﬁt and the chance of recovery. The analysis consists of examining an extended
example: generalization is obviously possible, but little additional insight would be
gained by moving to a more abstract setting.
We begin with introductory discussion of liquidity.
2 Liquidity: An Introduction
Liquidity is one of those terms that is extremely widely used despite (or perhaps
because of) the fact that it does not have a single clear meaning. Until recently it
would have been fair to say that the term has no clear meaning. However, in the
last several years a number of papers have appeared that use the term in a way that
is precise, but is still related to earlier and less formal discussions.
It is becoming increasingly clear that no single formal model can capture all of the
various meanings of the term “liquidity”. For example, a ﬁrm or ﬁnancial institution
may have access to positive net present value investments, but may be unable to
2obtain ﬁnancial backing to implement these projects. Such a ﬁrm is said to be solvent,
because of the availability of proﬁtable investment projects, but illiquid, because it
cannot ﬁnance them. Most such discussions do not provide a clear explanation
of why ﬁnancing is not forthcoming despite the availability of proﬁtable investment
projects. However, Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole [1] provided a model that has
exactly this property. In their model ﬁrms have access to an investment project
that is risky, but has positive net present value. Their ﬁrms have cash, but they
also borrow from outside investors so as to implement their investment projects on a
larger scale. After the investment decision has been made the ﬁrm will face a random
liquidity shock, resulting in abandonment of the project unless new cash is supplied.
Further, ﬁrm management has the option to manage diligently, resulting in a high
probability of success, or shirk, resulting in a low probability of success. Shirking
generates a side payment (perks) to management. The assumed parameter values
are such that in equilibrium ﬁrms manage eﬃciently, and the equilibrium ﬁnancial
contract involves payments to managers to induce them not to shirk.
Combining liquidity shocks with the possibility of shirking on the part of man-
agement results in a surprisingly complex equilibrium. Ex ante, the fact that man-
agement cannot precommit to managing diligently results in misallocation of capital
(positive net present value projects are rejected), reducing the surplus that manage-
ment would otherwise be able to appropriate. Ex post, under intermediate values
of the liquidity shock, ﬁrms would like to continue the investment project, because it
has positive net present value, but they are cash-constrained. They have exhausted
their cash, and cannot raise cash from outside investors because the side payment re-
quired to induce diligent management renders the project unproﬁtable to the outside
investors. Therefore the ﬁrm abandons the project. Holmstrom-Tirole’s model is
seen to imply a fully explicit account of why ﬁrms might be solvent but illiquid.
As Holmstrom-Tirole noted, their model does not give a complete account of
the term “liquidity”: the term has other connotations that take the analysis in a
diﬀerent direction. In some discussions a market is said to be liquid to the extent
that sellers can count on quickly locating buyers who can pay a high price. This
was the sense in which the term was used in the introduction. This consideration
points toward the literature on search and matching. The paper of Krainer-LeRoy
cited above contains a model in which endogenous variables widely associated with
liquidity, such as equilibrium expected time to sale and the size of the equilibrium
discount for immediate sale, are related to parameters representing search costs. The
eﬀects were as expected: the higher the liquidity of the market, the shorter the
expected time to sale and the lower the equilibrium discount for immediate sale. In
Kelly-LeRoy an equilibrium is derived in which investors purchase illiquid assets using
defaultable debt. It turns out that the availability of the default option implies that
preexisting debt is not a sunk cost, as it would be if the debt were nondefaultable. The
equilibrium strategy for selling the illiquid asset depends on the level of preexisting
debt: the higher the debt, the more valuable is the option to default, and therefore
3the higher is the selling price.
These papers, although also dealing with liquidity, are unrelated to Holmstrom-
Tirole; for example, they do not address the possibility of the joint occurrence of
solvency and illiquidity in the sense discussed above. The conclusion is that expecting
any single model of liquidity to address all the meanings that the term has acquired
is unrealistic. The model to be presented in this paper views liquidity in the same
manner as its predecessors; it does not broaden the ﬁeld to include considerations
such as those analyzed by Holmstrom-Tirole.
3 Perfect Liquidity
The best way to begin developing the connection between illiquidity and ﬁre sale
pricing is to analyze a version of our model in which the market for the capital good
is perfectly liquid, meaning that the seller of the capital good can immediately locate
a buyer with the highest possible valuation.
We assume that there exists a single capital good, a factory, and that the proﬁt
accruing to the owner of the factory is a random walk with binomial innovations:
xt+1 = xt + εt+1, (1)
where e εt+1 = ±ε with equal probability. At each date t the owner of the capital
good will oﬀer it for sale to one potential buyer. The seller sets the price p(xt),
reﬂecting the presumption that the current owner’s proﬁt rate will aﬀect the optimal
sale price. Each potential buyer of the factory can generate initial operating proﬁt
y that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Potential buyers for whom initial
proﬁte q u a l s1 obviously have the highest valuation of the factory, and in liquid
markets sellers assume that they have immediate access to buyers with this valuation.
Therefore potential buyers with lower initial proﬁt are irrelevant to the equilibrium
(contrary to the case of illiquid markets, as we will see below). If the proﬁt xt
accruing to the current owner equals or exceeds 1, the value of the factory to the
current owner equals or exceeds its value to any potential buyer, so the current owner
will not oﬀer it for sale (or, equivalently, will oﬀer it for sale at such a high price that
the probability of sale is zero). Accordingly, in that case the valuation function p(x)








for x =1+ε,1+2 ε,..., where all agents are risk neutral and have discount rate β.
When x =1the owner of the factory knows that if the realization of e ε equals −ε he
will attach a lower valuation to the factory than a potential buyer would, since he
would generate proﬁto f1−ε, compared with 1 for potential buyers. In that case he
will sell the factory for price p(1). Sale is assumed to occur immediately. Thus the


































(see Appendix A). Since 0 <b 2 < 1, the value p(x) of the factory converges to
βx/(1 − β) as x →∞ .F i g u r e 1 graphs the value of the factory for β =0 .9 and
ε =0 .1. The vertical distance between p(x) and βx/(1 − β) measures the value to
the owner of the factory of the option to sell it for price p(1). This option, of course,
will be exercised when x =1and e ε = −ε, and only then.
The value of the option is highest for low values of x, as the diagram indicates.
The convergence of p(x) to βx/(1 − β) reﬂects the fact that the value of the option
to sell for price p(1) when x =1− ε has negligible value when x is high. This
is so because even though x will eventually drop to 1 − ε with probability 1,t h i s
event is likely to occur only in the very distant future. It contributes little to the
current value of the factory, due to discounting. Proﬁtability x cannot fall below
1 − ε because the realization e ε = −ε results in immediate sale when x =1 .
There also exists a continuum of solution paths that do not converge to βx/(1−β)
(these paths occur when the second root b1 of a quadratic equation has nonzero coef-
ﬁcient; see Appendix A). Along the nonconvergent paths the factory has a positive
or negative bubble. Following precedent, we exclude these bubble paths.
This example makes clear that in liquid markets there are no ﬁre sales: for x>1
no price exists that is mutually agreeable both to the current owner and any potential
owner, while in the case x =1− ε the owner will sell for price p(1),t h em a x i m u m
price that buyers are willing to pay.
4 Illiquid Markets
In illiquid markets the owner of the factory cannot count on locating a buyer with
maximal operating proﬁt immediately. Therefore potential buyers with initial proﬁt
less than 1 are relevant to the equilibrium, in contrast to the case of perfect liquidity.
Following Krainer-LeRoy [3] and Kelly-LeRoy [2], we assume that each period one
and only one potential buyer is available. Buyers know the realization of their initial
proﬁt rates, whereas the seller knows only the distribution of initial proﬁtr a t e s . I f














Value of the Factory Given Perfect Liquidity,  β =0.9, ε =0.1
p(x)
β  x/(1- β )
Figure 1: Equilibrium Price; Perfect Liquidity
6the potential buyer purchases the factory, the proﬁt rate will evolve from the buyer’s
initial proﬁt level according to (1), with y replacing xt, while if he does not, the would-
be seller will continue to operate the factory, with proﬁt evolving from xt according
to (1).
The seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, which the buyer will accept if the proﬁt
he can generate operating the factory is high enough to justify purchase. The seller
will only oﬀer the factory for sale at a price strictly higher than the valuation justiﬁed
by his own proﬁt rate, since there would be no point in selling otherwise. Conse-
quently, as before, when x>1 no potential buyer can generate as much proﬁta st h e
current owner of the factory, so the factory will not be sold. When x<1 there exist
potential buyers whose initial proﬁt exceeds that of the current owner, implying the
possibility of sale. The owner will oﬀer the factory for sale at a price that balances
the probability of sale, which depends on the sale price, against the potential capital
gain generated as the diﬀerence between the price and the seller’s valuation. One
expects that the lower the value of xt, the greater the ﬁre sale discount, and this
turns out to be the case in equilibrium.
As e to fv a l u e so fx, bounded above by 1, exist such that for those values of x the
factory will be oﬀered for sale at a price such that the probability of sale is strictly
between 0 and 1. Any of these values of x can occur in equilibrium if earlier attempts
to sell fail because of the low initial proﬁts of potential buyers, and if the seller’s proﬁt
innovations are negative. However, if proﬁtability is negative and suﬃciently high in
absolute value–denote this level x–the owner will set a price such that the factory
sells with probability 1 at that level of proﬁtability. The critical level of proﬁtability
x satisﬁes
q(0) = β(x + p(x)), (6)
so that even a buyer with y =0will break even if he purchases the factory. Since
potential buyers’ initial proﬁtability is bounded by 0 and 1, it follows that x−ε
constitutes a lower bound on the proﬁt rates that can occur in equilibrium.
In an illiquid market the seller’s problem, to determine the price at which to oﬀer
the factory for sale, is nontrivial. To solve it, let q(x) be the value to the seller of
the factory when proﬁte q u a l sx. Because the seller chooses sale prices to maximize





(λ(x + ε)+λ(x − ε)), (7)
where λ(x+ε) and λ(x−ε) are the values of the factory conditional on the high and
low proﬁt innovations, respectively, given by
λ(x)=µ(p(x))p(x)+( 1− µ(p(x)))q(x). (8)
As in the case of liquid markets, the convention on notation presumes that the seller
learns the realization of e ε before setting the sale price. The sale price is p(x + ε) or
7p(x − ε) and the probability of sale as a function of the seller’s price is µ(p(x + ε))
or µ(p(x − ε)). The function µ(p) is determined by the solving the buyer’s problem,
and is taken as given by the seller.
The probability of sale is determined by the sale price and the realization y of the
random variable e y denoting the buyer’s initial proﬁt. The probability of sale equals
the probability that the buyer’s proﬁt exceeds a reservation proﬁtr a t ey∗ which is
such that the value of the factory to the buyer just equals its sale price. If e y is
distributed uniformly on [0,1],w eh a v e :





We computed the equilbrium, again taking β =0 .9 and ε =0 .1. An outline
of the solution algorithm is provided in Appendix B. Figure 2 shows equilibrium
values of q(x) plotted against the upper asymptote βx/(1 − β) and the lower limit
β(x+p(x)), which is reahced when x = x. Figure 3 plots q(x) against p(x) and µ(x).
As expected, the value of the factory is an increasing function of proﬁtability. For
very high values of x we have that q(x) approaches βx/(1 − β), again reﬂecting the
facts that the option to sell has negligible value for high values of x, and that the
solution algorithm excluded equilibria with bubbles. For values of x slightly above
1, q(x) exceeds βx/(1 − β) by nonnegligible amounts; the reason here is the same
as in the preceding section. For x<1, sale of the factory becomes possible. The
seller oﬀers it for sale at a price approximately halfway between q(x) and q(1) (when
x is near 1), since doing so maximizes the expected proﬁts from sale, since doing so
maximizes the expected proceeds of the sale (a similar phenomenon was noted by
Krainer-LeRoy [3]).
When proﬁtability declines below 1, the sale price is reduced below q(1) = p(1) =
9.503.T h e d i ﬀerence between p(1) and p(x) represents a ﬁre sale discount. For
x =0the seller is aware that all potential buyers can earn a higher rate of proﬁts
than he can. However, as a monopolistic seller he sets a sale price that will prevent
sale to buyers with low (but positive) y so as to exploit potential buyers with high
y. Also, the seller makes appropriate allowance for the fact that potential buyers
are aware that they too will have the option to oﬀer the factory for sale at a higher
price, so even a buyer with zero proﬁtability would assign positive value to the factory
based on the fact that he could oﬀer it for sale in the next period.
When proﬁtability declines to x= −1.460 the seller prices the factory to sell with
probability 1. This event, the ultimate ﬁre sale, occurs at a sale price of 5.790.T h e
seller is aware that at sale prices higher than 5.790, potential buyers with zero or very
low proﬁtability will be deterred from purchasing the factory, implying that the high
rate of losses may continue. Correspondingly, there is no reason to oﬀer the factory
8for sale for a price lower than 5.790 because even buyers with initial proﬁtability of
z e r ow i l lp u r c h a s ei ta tt h a tp r i c e .














Value of the Factory and Limiting Functions,  β =0.9, ε =0.1
q(x)
β  x/(1- β )
β  x + β  p(0)
Figure 2: Equilibrium Value; Illiquidity



















Figure 3: Value, Sale Price and Probability of Sale
5 Parametrizing Illiquidity
The ﬁn a le x e r c i s ei st oi n v e s t i g a t et h ee ﬀect of specifying more or less illiquidity on
the equilibrium pricing strategy. Since we are maintaining the assumption that one
and only one prospective buyer arrives per period, the natural way to alter liquidity
is to vary the length of the period (here we follow Krainer and LeRoy [3]). We expect
that when the period is short, so that buyers arrive rapidly, the seller will set a high
price. In that case sale in any period occurs with low probability. This is acceptable
to the seller because a new prospective buyer will be along shortly. However, one
anticipates that Krainer-LeRoy’s ﬁnding that the expected time to sale will be low in
highly liquid markets will also occur here. In contrast, in illiquid markets sellers who
operate the factory unproﬁtably will set a lower price than they would if liquidity
10were higher, since failure to sell to the current buyer implies that the current low rate
of proﬁt will persist for a relatively long time.
To parametrize illiquidity, we refer to the unit length of time as the year. In the
preceding section one buyer arrived per year. Now we assume instead that n buyers
arrive per year, so that the next buyer will arrive 1/n years after the current buyer.
This necessitates several changes in (7). First, the innovations in proﬁtability are
±ε
p
1/n rather than ±ε, since that assumption preserves the variance of the annual
innovation in proﬁtability at ε2. Second, we replace the discount factor β by β
1/n.
T h i r d ,s i n c ew ec o n t i n u et om e a s u r ep r o ﬁt x at annual rates, it is necessary to divide
x by n.T h u s i f w e d e ﬁne q(x,n) as the value of a factory with annual proﬁtability

















where λ(x,n) is given by
λ(x,n)=µ(p(x,n))p(x,n)+( 1− µ(p(x,n)))q(x,n). (12)
Here the maximum is taken over p(x + ε
p
1/n) and p(x − ε
p
1/n).
Figure 4 shows q(x,n) and p(x,n) for various values of n (NOT YET AVAIL-
ABLE). The plots are as expected: for any value of x the factory is worth more
in liquid markets than illiquid markets. This makes sense: the factory can be sold
more quickly and for a higher price in liquid markets, so for ﬁxed x it is worth more
in liquid markets. For any x the value of the factory less the value of the sale option
is β
1/nx/n(1 − β
1/n). This value increases with n, approaching an upper asymptote
of xln(1/β), as is readily veriﬁed using l’Hopital’s rule. Finally, x(n), the level of
proﬁtability at which sale occurs with probability 1, approaches 1 as n goes to inﬁnity.
The reason is that in highly liquid markets even sellers who can operate the factory
with fairly high proﬁt are able to sell it quickly to prospective buyers with still higher
proﬁtability. In the limit equilibrium proﬁtability will never decline below 1.2
A ﬁre sale occurs when the factory is sold at a price strictly lower than a prospec-
tive buyer who can operate the factory with maximal proﬁtability would be will-
ing to pay. Expressed as a fraction, the discount would be deﬁned by (p(1,n) −
q(x,1))/p(1,n). Alternatively, the discount could be deﬁned relative to the price
that a buyer with proﬁtability 1 would be willing to pay if markets were perfectly
liquid: (p(1,∞) − q(x,1))/p(1,∞). There does not seem to be any reason to prefer
one of these deﬁnitions to the other.
2The representation of perfectly liquid markets in the model of this section diﬀers from that of
Section 3. Here perfect liquidity occurs only in the limit, when time is continuous and proﬁtability
follows a Wiener process. In Section 1 we maintained the discrete time setting and assumed perfect
liquidity directly. The model of Section 3 has the advantage that it is easier to understand, whereas
the model of this section has a more explicit justiﬁcation.
Most properties of the equilibrium are the same in the two cases. For example, both speciﬁcations
imply that in equilibrium proﬁtability never falls below 1.
116 Empirical Evidence
The model just presented generates several empirical implications. First, the prices
at which illiquid assets are sold depend on how proﬁtably these assets are operated
by their current owners. This is so because the owners of these assets are aware
that they may not succeed in selling these assets immediately due to their illiquid
nature. Therefore their pricing strategies balance prospective sale proceeds against
the operating proﬁt the current owners can expect if they fail to sell. In contrast,
if, contrary to the assumption of the present model, the seller knew that there exist
many potential buyers with higher valuations than he has, as in liquid markets, he
could sell the assets using an auction with no reservation price. In that case the sale
price would not depend on the seller’s valuation. Second, an easy extension of the
model presented here would show that if the seller has information about diﬀerent
buyers’ valuations, the model predicts that that information will be reﬂe c t e di ns a l e
p r i c e s . T h i si ss ob e c a u s et h es e l l e r ’ sg u e s sa b o u tt h eb u y e r ’ sv a l u a t i o na ﬀects the
probability of sale.
Todd C. Pulvino’s recent study [4] of sales of used aircraft by airline gave strong
support to these predictions, although Pulvino interpreted his results diﬀerently than
we will here. Pulvino deﬁned ﬁre sales as liquidations at prices below fundamental
value. The presumption apparently was that fundamental value is the same for all
agents.3 Such sales occur because of the “ﬁnancial distress” of the selling ﬁrm, a con-
cept that we did not make use of in the present paper. Pulvino adopted the analysis of
liquidation developed by Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny [5]. Shleifer-Vishny pro-
posed that ﬁre sales will occur when most ﬁrms in an industry are cash-constrained,
and therefore are willing to sell industry-speciﬁc assets to outsiders for less than their
fundamental value. Pulvino found that variables purportedly measuring the extent
to which airlines were cash-constrained (such as debt ratios) were correlated with the
prices of used aircraft: ﬁnancially constrained airlines received lower prices than those
which were not ﬁnancially constrained. Further, during recessions airlines are more
likely to sell aircraft to outsiders, such as ﬁnancial institutions than during periods
of prosperity, and when they do so they receive lower prices.
Pulvino interpreted these ﬁndings as supporting the Shleifer-Vishny account of
ﬁre sales. However, his results can also be interpreted from the vantage of the model
developed here, in which ﬁrms are never ﬁnancially distressed in the sense of Shleifer
and Vishny. Variables that Pulvino interpreted as measuring ﬁnancial distress are
surely highly correlated with proﬁtability: why would an airline’s balance sheet
deteriorate if it is able to operate its aircraft proﬁtably? If balance sheet variables
are interpreted as measuring proﬁtability, the model of this paper predicts exactly
the negative correlation between indebtedness and sale prices that Pulvino found.
Pulvino’s ﬁnding that sales of aircraft to ﬁnancial institutions occurred at low
3In contrast, in the model of this paper successful sale occurs at a price that is below the
fundamental value of the buyer but above that of the seller, so that both parties gain from the sale.
12prices is also as expected. When the buyer of used aircraft is an airline, the seller
reasonably presumes that the buyer can make proﬁtable use of the aircraft being
sold, and sets their prices accordingly. On the other hand, when the buyer is a
ﬁnancial institution which is planning on mothballing the aircraft until the market
turns around, the seller knows that the buyer’s decision is based entirely on projected
future resale value, resulting in lower prices. The model of this paper could readily be
extended to cover this case by specifying that some prospective buyers can credibly
precommit to some ﬁxed proﬁtability rate, such as zero, that is below the average of
other buyers’ proﬁtability. Depending on the sellers’ proﬁtability, sellers might be
willing to sell to such buyers at lower prices.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The results of this paper shows that ﬁre sale discounts occur in illiquid markets
because the seller, who is unable to operate the factory as proﬁtably as other owners
could, wishes to locate a buyer more quickly than would be likely to occur in the
absence of a discount. In illiquid markets ﬁre sales may involve a sizeable discount,
whereas in liquid markets they involve only a small discount, since a small discount
is suﬃcient to ensure quick sale.
8 Appendix A: Solution to Diﬀerence Equation
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Deﬁning p(εt) as pt, it is seen that (14) is equivalent to the diﬀerence equation
0=2 εt + pt+1 −
2
β
pt + pt−1. (15)
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Assuming that bubbles can be excluded, we are interested in the solution for which
pt converges to βεt/(1 − β). Since b1 > 1, this can only occur if A1 =0 .






































































































as x increases since b2 < 1.
9 Appendix B: Solution Algorithm
We ﬁrst transformed the seller’s decision from setting a sales price to an equivalent
choice of the minimum valuation buyer who will buy the factory. Given a sales price
of ph, the buyer with the lowest valuation who will buy the factory has valuation xh,

















This change makes possible an analytic solution to the buyer’s problem, in contrast
to the formulation of Equation (7), which requires a numerical solution.








Here q0(x) is a lower bound for q(x) (see Fig. 2). Given q0(x), we computed the
optimal oﬀers xh and xl for a grid of possible values of x and substituted the solutions

















We then approximated q1(x) with a function b q1(x) that is diﬀerentiable and that
converges to βx plus a constant for low values of x and to βx/(1−β) for high values




g(x)+( βx+ Ai)(1− g(x)) + g(x)(1− g(x))h(x;Bi)
g(x)=
1










β (λ(x; b qi−1)+ν(x;b qi−1)), (24)
and repeated until kqi(x) − qi−1(x)kx < 0.0001 under the sup norm.
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